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God-Relationships With and Without God, by James Kellenberger. New
York: st. Martin's Press, 1989. Pp. xi and 174. $39.95.

JOSEPH RUNZO, Chapman University.
With its purposively provocative title, this book offers a valuable analysis of
the nature and varieties of human relationships with Divine Reality.
Kellenberger argues (1) that meaningful (and ethical) religious praxis is a
function of the relationship between the individual and Divine Reality and
(2) that the same sort of fundamental relationship-an "abiding relationship" -is central to all religious traditions, whether they do or do not explicitly involve God. In the first part of the book, which draws heavily on
Kierkegaard's views, Kellenberger provides a direct and clear account of
God-relationships, focusing on their moral characteristics. The second part is
more ambitious, though ultimately less successful, addressing religious
pluralism in terms of God-relationships. Overall, the book is written with
admirable clarity and a skillful use of literature, from Conrad's Lord Jim
to Tolstoy to Gide, to explicate crucial aspects of relationships with Divine
Reality.
The groundwork for understanding God-relationships is laid in the first part
by analyzing the connection between God-relationships and religious morality. After explaining the notions of a guilt and a shame morality, Kellenberger
suggests that a religious sin morality is unlike a shame morality because one
attempts to live in accordance with one's God-relationship, not some personal
ideal. Indeed, a religious sin morality is essentially a guilt morality, since
violating the God-relationship is a sin. However, a religious sin morality also
differs from ordinary guilt moralities insofar as one does not follow moral
rules for the sake of a principle (or for self-interest), but is instead required
to act-out of trust-for the sake of God. Thus, religious sin morality involves a faith relationship.
Faith involves beliefs about the "object" of faith. In contradistinction to a
faith relationship, Kellenberger next develops the notion of an "abiding relationship." He has in mind here such relationships as "walking humbly with
God," "seeking to do what is right," "love of neighbor," and even being a
"devout skeptic" (pp. 84-89). Thus an abiding relationship is "a relationship
to Divine Reality ... [where] the individual may not become conscious of
being related to Divine Reality ... [and] which is not dependent on a belief in
Divine Reality ..... (p. 83). Kellenberger then employs this notion of an abiding relationship to address the pressing problem of religious pluralism, concluding that it provides a key, even if not the sole, solution. I will consider
three difficulties with this latter part of Kellenberger's project.
Consider first Kellenberger's proposal that the "way of (abiding) relationships" serves as a solution to the problem of religious pluralism because it
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"recognizes the cognitivity of religion, while allowing cognitivity to recede
in importance" (p. 140). The value of this approach is that it avoids the
parochial limitations of the exclusivist's emphasis on tradition-specific doctrine. Indeed, in order to encompass the wide range of religious attitudes and
practices, Kellenberger suggests that one might have an abiding relationship
to Divine Reality in virtue of a commitment to justice for the oppressed, or
the pursuit of world peace. But cast in such broad terms, how does this differ
from secular humanism? And why call such relationships God-relationships-or even religious relationships? Despite Kellenberger's interesting
idea that, without explicit or implicit theistic cognitive content, one might
have a "God-relationship without God," it remains unconvincing that nontheistic abiding relationships, such as Brahman-relationships, can be properly
referred to as "God-relationships" (and vice versa). In general, the more one
insists that abiding relationships do not require (some) correct knowledge, or
at least true beliefs, about Divine Reality, the less likely they are to be
properly directed to Divine Reality, ensuing in correct religious praxis. Yet
the more one allows that knowledge, or true belief, about the "object" of the
relation is essential to all religious relations, the less successful is
Kellenberger's resolution of the conflicts among differing religious traditions: for then God-relationships appear to differ fundamentally from nontheistic relationships.
Kellenberger never entirely makes clear the ultimate significance of the
cognitive in religion, and religious relationships. He is quite clear in developing the notion of a faith relationship to God that faith necessarily
involves belief. But in preparation for his eventual solution to the problem
of religious pluralism, Kellenberger argues that "given the logic of belief
in or faith in ... one can have a wrong conception of God and yet believe
or have faith in Him" (p. 77). While there are important limits to how
misguided one's conception can be-for faith involves trust, implying that
God must be personal-Kellenberger concludes that different religious traditions, despite even mutually incompatible beliefs about God, "yet believe
in the same God." This brings us to a second, related problem, regarding
God-relationships.
It can of course turn out that two individuals with radically opposed beliefs
about some entity are actually referring to, acting toward, holding beliefs
about, etc. that entity. But believing in or having faith in the same God
requires more than this. For right religious praxis, based on faith, requires
a proper directedness toward the object of belief. One who believes God
is malevolent and acts on that belief, and one who believes in the God of
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, do not have faith in the same God. Hence, we
need a fuller explication of the extent to which theistic beliefs can be
incompatible, and still be about God. And extending this point, we need to
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know more about the degree to which beliefs in theistic and non-theistic
traditions can be incompatible, and still count in a like sense as "abiding
relationships. "
This brings us to a third and more significant problem with the notion of
an "abiding relationship." Kellenberger suggests that one has an abiding
relationship with Divine Reality through commitment and practice, not in
virtue of one's particular beliefs or the nature of one's faith. From this he
concludes that persons with non-personal, as well as persons with personal,
conceptions of the Divine-and even those with non-religious world-views
like Marxism or secular humanism-can have like abiding relationships. If
so, abiding relationships would provide a commonality, and perhaps even a
sort of global glue, which resolves the apparent conflict among the world
religions. Yet while the resultant acceptance of diverse religious viewpoints
would be both desirable and important, this religious harmony is bought at
considerable cost. For Kellenberger also insists that there must be a Divine
Reality (or possibly Realities) to which individuals are related in abiding
relationships. But this runs the danger of becoming a contentless notion,
where "Divine Reality" is not to be understood as either theistic or non-theistic, much less specifically Christian or Advaita Vedantic. The prima facie
advantage of the sort of resolution of the problem of religious pluralism which
Kellenberger proposes is that the question of the correctness of the truthclaims of each tradition becomes "relatively unimportant" (p. 141). But as
the examples Kellenberger himself uses to illustrate this show, the more the
cognitive content of religion is set aside, the less clear it becomes whether
the purported resolution is effected. For most fundamentally, it is unclear
whether there can be abiding relationships which, as Kellenberger holds, are
not at all a matter of belief.
One problem, to which Kellenberger is sensitive, is that non-theistic religious traditions, much as Zen Buddhism and Advaitist forms of Hinduism,
do not seem to involve a relationship to Divine Reality. Kellenberger's solution is (a) we do not need to determine if the Christian, say, and the Buddhist
are in exactly the same sort of abiding relationship, and (b) for the non-theistic traditions, it is enlightenment or realization which functions as the key,
religious relationship (p. 145). Regarding (a), the question is not whether
there is some sort of relationship centrally operative in all world religions,
but rather whether the operative relationships are the right sort to provide a
significant likeness among them. This remains unsettled. More specifically,
regarding (b), for Kellenberger "abiding with God" is paradigmatic and it is
hard to see how "relating to the Eightfold Path in Theravada Buddhism"
(Kellenberger's example) is, in an illuminating way, like relating to a personal
Deity. For instance, the ethical dimension of a faith relationship to God which
Kellenberger explicates does not seem applicable to one's "relationship" to
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a non-personal "way." Kellenberger does suggest that whether the Christian
and Buddhist are in the same abiding relationship (love of neighbor and God,
and compassion for the world, respectively) would be determined by the
sameness of practice (love or compassion). Even so, we are still left wondering precisely which features of their respective practices we are to look at to
see if the Theravada Buddhist and the Christian are alike in their respective
religious relationships. Again, Kellenberger's account of abiding relationships lacks sufficient content to provide a resolution.
To illustrate his view of abiding relationships, Kellenberger suggests two
analogies (p. 82 & 141). Just as one may walk with another without knowing
the other, or even that the other is there, so too, Kellenberger suggests, one
can walk with God in an abiding relationship without knowing God. However,
while one might perform the act of walking next to someone without knowing
it, this does not parallel the sense in which the theist says that someone "truly"
walks with God. Put in Kellenberger's terms, if God exists, then in a sense
all creatures "walk with God," but not all have a (personal) relationship with
God. As Kellenberger acknowledges, one must consider an individual's background beliefs to understand his or her actions. Thus, one's beliefs differentiate standing around idly from surreptitiously watching others under the
guise of a languid pose. Just so, the difference between walking along with
God and truly walking with God, between co-existing with God and relating
to God, is, in part, a matter of one's beliefs: e.g., Christian beliefs which
conflict with Buddhist, and Hindu, and Moslem beliefs. Since beliefs are a
determining factor of religious praxis, the conflict between the world religions remains. Again, Kellenberger suggests that every monogamous man
can say "my wife is the best wife in the world" without mutual contradiction
if thereby understood as proclaiming their "right individual relationships to
their wives." Likewise, suggests Kellenberger, adherents of the great world
religions can be in similar abiding relationships, even though their beliefs
conflict (p. 141). But this does not dissolve the literal contradiction among
the truth-claims of the married, or the truth-claims of the world religions-it
is just to set aside the cognitive content of those claims.
In sum, Kellenberger comes up against the same problem which confronts
other pluralist solutions (like that of John Hick, whose work Kellenberger
draws upon) to the conflicting truth-claims of the world religions. Either the
specificity of the claims of each world religion is taken seriously-and then
the truth-claims certainly appear to conflict-or the claims are set aside, or
reduced in relevance-and then there is no real harmony because there is
little substantive, cognitively significant content in the world religions to
harmonize. Kellenberger's attempt to resolve this problem is original and
ambitious. But within his particular account, either the world religions may
be viewed as being in close accord, but at the cost of diluting the notion of
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an "abiding relationship," or God-relationships do not really apply to nontheistic relationships, and the problem of apparent contradiction among the
world religions remains unresolved. Even so, Kellenberger helps us see the
seminal importance of abiding relationships. And his development of the
notion of an abiding relationship is illuminating in itself, especially when
applied individually to Christianity, or other world religions.

